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While government safety-net programs are used to mitigate the price risk for commodity 
producers, limited programs exist for specialty crop producers.  Specialty crop producers 
utilize forward contracts to reduce downside price risk.  In order to estimate the method 
of price-risk management, if any, that is preferable to selling at market determined prices, 
a stochastic simulation model was constructed.  The completed simulation model was 
used to estimate probability distributions for Salinas Valley net income under different 
pricing scenarios.  Probabilities of reaching various net income thresholds were 
compared.  Results indicate that Salinas Valley lettuce producers should maximize 
profitability by using forward contracts. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
arming has historically been a risky venture, with the amount of risk being a function 
of many factors.  Traditionally, price and yield risk have been recognized as the 
primary challenges causing financial uncertainty for agricultural producers.  Many 
producers recognize that risk has some benefit, and that while risk is associated with the 
possibility of less than desirable outcomes, it is also associated with the possibility of 
greater reward.  Economists distinguish between risk and uncertainty; risk is associated 
with a known probability distribution, whereas there is no known or expected probability 
density function when dealing with uncertainty (Roberts, et al).  Accurate estimates of the 
probabilities of particular outcomes for price and yield help to change uncertainty to 
measurable risk. 
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Methods of reducing price risk do exist, and take one of two general forms:  Policy 
mechanisms and market mechanisms.  Policy mechanisms are defined as risk controls 
that result from official government policy.  Market mechanisms are defined as those 
measures taken at the sole discretion of market participants, as a conscious means of 
managing risk (Roberts, et al).  Researchers are continually examining the effects of these 
different mechanisms in reducing income variability, as well as their effects on the long-
run net income of agricultural producers. 
Government policy has been implemented on an ongoing basis, in order to help 
agricultural producers reduce their risks.  Historically, government programs have taken 
the form of price supports and supply control programs.  In recent years, government 
policy has been expanded to include counter-cyclical payments and increased subsidies 
on yield and revenue insurance.   Most price support programs have traditionally been 
administered through the Commodity Credit Corporation.  Direct payments from the 
federal government to farmers in the U.S. exceeded $20 billion per year 1999-2001.  
Nearly all payments went to corn, soybean, wheat, rice, and cotton producers.  Federal 
crop insurance programs include provisions for specialty crops1, however, revenue limits 
have made participation by most specialty crop producers negligible (Roberts, et al). 
The lack of comprehensive safety-net programs for specialty crops is in part due to the 
fact that the number of commodity producers far exceeds the number of specialty crop 
producers in the United States.  Therefore, commodity producers tend to have more 
political power than specialty crop producers (Hamilton).  Commodities are produced in 
the vast majority of U.S. states, while a small number of states produce the majority of 
many specialty crops.  For example, as of 2001, California and Arizona produced 
approximately 96% of U.S. lettuce (Glaser, et al).  Corn, in contrast, was grown 
commercially in over one half of all U.S. states.  Lastly, some specialty crop growers 
embrace the risk involved in their operations, and believe that a price support would 
actually make them less profitable, because supply would tend to increase with a decrease 
in risk (Bunn). 
California specialty crop producers in general and Salinas Valley lettuce producers 
specifically, have relied on market mechanisms such as forward contracting, rather than 
government programs, in order to mitigate price risk.  Nearly 100% of Salinas Valley 
lettuce producers use some form of contract arrangement (grower/shipper panel).  
Growers will often contract with buyers on an annual or seasonal basis, specifying the 
price, quality and quantity of the product that will change hands at some point in the 
future.  The proliferation of forward contracts is often associated with the growing market 
concentration at all levels of the value chain (Carriquiry and Babcock). 
The growth of single source buyers from large chain stores such as Wal-Mart has 
created an environment in which lettuce producers have an increasingly smaller number 
of potential buyers for their product.  Large buyers have the capacity to commit to 
purchasing the entire output of individual firms.  Therefore, producers view this strategy 
as a way of always having a “home” for their production, and a way to remove price risk 
from their market.  However, while forward contracting does help to eliminate the 
extreme downside risk in prices, it adds a new form of price risk, because these contracts 
can exclude producers from receiving extremely high prices in times of price spikes 
(Carriquiry and Babcock). 
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An issue for Salinas Valley lettuce growers is:  What method of price risk 
management, if any, is preferable to selling at market determined prices, given the 
objective of maximizing the long-run profitability of the Salinas Valley head lettuce 
industry?  The challenge in answering this question is in accurately identifying and 
quantifying the costs and benefits from different risk control mechanisms that accrue to 
lettuce growers. 
In this paper, we estimate the future benefits and costs of differing price-risk 
management mechanisms on the net income of Salinas Valley lettuce producers.  Salinas 
Valley lettuce was chosen as it is representative of a broad group of perishable specialty 
crops for which no government price support exists, and for which forward contracting 
has become commonplace.  The Salinas Valley lettuce industry plays a large economic 
role in both California and U.S. agriculture.  Moreover, the industry is interesting because 
earlier studies on the costs and benefits of forward contracting have been done on non-
perishable commodity crops, in which the assumptions of perfect competition are more 
closely intact.  We find that given the assumptions made, forward contracting optimally 
mitigates price risk for Salinas Valley lettuce producers by maximizing the long run 
profitability of that industry. 
 
 
Background 
The California agricultural sector plays a vital role in the U.S. agriculture industry.  
California ranks first among states in total market value of agricultural products.  In 2002, 
total California agricultural output was valued at nearly $26 billion.  California specialty 
crops represent a large portion of the total agricultural output of the state, and in 2002 
were valued at approximately $23 billion.  California was ranked as the number one state 
producer of fruits, vegetables, nuts, nursery, and dairy products (2002 USDA Census of 
Agriculture). 
The sheer size of the Monterey County lettuce industry indicates the significance of 
this project in terms of the industry’s financial importance to both California and U.S. 
agriculture.  Monterey County, California was ranked as the number one U.S. county in 
total value of crop production (over $2 billion in 2002), and number one in vegetable 
production and lettuce production specifically.  Lettuce accounted for the highest total 
value crop produced in the county, at a value of over $738 million, which dwarfed the 
number two ranked broccoli at $266 million (2002 USDA Census of Agriculture). 
Forward contracting has become very commonplace in the specialty crop industry.  
Growers will often contract with buyers on an annual or seasonal basis, specifying the 
price, quality and quantity of the product that will change hands at some point in the 
future (Glaser: May 2001).  For example, nearly 100% of Salinas Valley lettuce 
producers use some form of contract arrangement (Bunn, et al).  Carriquiry summarizes 
the reasons for this proliferation in forward contracting; farmers enter into contracts to 
reduce price risk and to increase their financial leverage.  Buyers enter into contracts to 
reduce price risk and to maintain a predictable, high quality source of supply.  Buyers 
also use contracting as a way to induce risk-averse farmers to produce a higher quality, 
more value-added product.  Roberts, et al suggest that the increased use of contracts is 
associated with the growing market concentration at all levels of the value chain.  The 
growth of single source buyers indicates an increase in monopsony power, and can cause 
 3
a distinct marketing challenge for those producers who have not built relationships with 
the few large buyers. 
The effects of an increasingly monopsonistic market in the specialty crop industry are 
compounded by the increasing costs of production.  As specialty crop yields per acre 
increase, they help to keep marginal costs lower, even in the face of increasing total costs.  
However, as certain costs outpace yield increases, rising land rents for example, it 
becomes increasingly important to producers to attempt to stabilize output prices at a 
high enough level in order to cover costs (Bunn).  By forward contracting at a level that is 
above expected costs, producers can help to eliminate the risk of losing money.  
However, yield risks still exist, and lower than expected yields can result in making a 
seemingly profitable contract actually unprofitable. 
Carriquiry and Babcock offer a framework for describing how economic factors 
influence the contracting behavior of farmers and processors, and found that participation 
in both spot and contract markets arises as a Nash equilibrium for a range of contract 
prices.  Their paper also analyzes the effect of contract price on the relative profitability 
of farmers and processors; indicating that processors and farmers have conflicting 
preferences with regard to contract price.  Carriquiry and Babcock empirically show that 
the price chosen by one party, if allowed to do so freely, would be the least desirable to 
the other party.  Their paper also mentions that the move toward production under 
contracts has some concerned about the viability of remaining spot markets, which can be 
associated with lower quality output. 
Menkhaus, et al, indicate that it is still undetermined if producers are better off 
utilizing forward contracts as opposed to spot markets.  They do suggest that sellers may 
be better off using spot markets, in the sense that total earnings are higher, however 
sellers face risks in using forward contracts, because per unit costs are unknown at the 
time of the agreement, which is primarily due to fluctuations in yield.  The unknown 
costs and benefits of forward contracting make the present research both timely and 
beneficial to specialty crop producers. 
 
 
Review of Lettuce Models 
In order to establish a starting point for both the theoretical and empirical modeling in 
this paper, three previous lettuce models were reviewed.  Strengths, limitations, and 
applicability to this research question were identified.  An overview of each model 
follows, beginning with the earliest, and ending with the most recent. 
The Baires and Clevenger (BC) econometric lettuce model, published in 1977, was 
used as a primary source of theoretical relationships for the model in this paper.  In the 
BC model, acreage planted was a function of acreage planted in the previous period and 
price in the previous period, and yield was a function of price.  They also pointed out that 
even in the 1970’s acreage planted decisions were based on the number of acres that 
could be forward contracted.  Output price at time of harvest was found to determine the 
proportion of lettuce harvested and shipped, and the proportion of lettuce plowed under.  
In addition, BC recognized that a suitable lettuce model must take into consideration 
weekly fluctuations in price and yield.  They also recognized that the lettuce industry is 
characterized by long periods of low prices followed by short periods of relatively high 
prices.  One limitation of their model is that it did not use a calculated index to estimate 
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weekly variables.  Instead it simply divided the seasonal results by the number of weeks 
in the season. 
Hammig and Mittelhammer (HM) reported that the lettuce market they modeled 
exemplified a situation in which the assumptions of perfect competition do not exist, and 
that a relatively small number of producers control the vast majority of lettuce production 
(1980).  Their model featured no long-term storage of lettuce, that imports are negligible, 
but significant exporting does take place.  They found that expected price was a 
significant determinant of acreage planted, that expected price was based on prices 
received in earlier periods, and that acreage with respect to expected price and variable 
production costs is inelastic.  They also recognized that on the average, four to five 
percent of planted lettuce is not harvested due to crop damage and due to the economic 
decision not to harvest.  If the market price at time of harvest will not cover the harvest 
costs, then the lettuce is plowed under.  Their model was used to assess the impacts of 
wage increases paid to farm labor.  Like the BC model, the HM model reported point 
estimates only. 
The U.S. Lettuce Supply and Utilization model developed by the National Food and 
Agricultural Policy Project (NFAPP) at Arizona State University was used as the starting 
point for modeling the lettuce subsector in this project.  The NFAPP model estimates 
U.S. supply and utilization through 2012 by using twelve regression equations, which 
produce point estimates for Arizona harvested acreage, Arizona yield per acre, California 
harvested acreage, California yield per acre, other U.S. harvested acreage, other U.S. 
yield, import quantity, export quantity, domestic consumption, retail-grower price 
margin, Arizona grower price, and California grower price.  The present research project 
augments the statistical methods used by NFAPP, by combining stochastic simulation 
with deterministic results in order to directly estimate probability distributions. 
 
 
Contributions of this Research 
Currently, there is a lack of up-to-date price-risk analyses, which incorporate the 
stochastic risks faced by Salinas Valley lettuce producers.  Forward contract pricing is 
widely used by Salinas Valley lettuce producers, but the future costs and benefits of that 
strategy have not been empirically estimated.  Other specialty crop sub-sectors share 
similar attributes with the Salinas Valley lettuce industry, and therefore face similar 
price-risk management challenges.  The contribution of the analysis presented is that it 
offers a current, robust, empirical, decision-making framework for Salinas Valley lettuce 
producers.  Furthermore, the information offers a framework, which may be applied to 
other specialty crop industries. 
This study supplements, with respect to providing relevant and accurate information 
about the costs and benefits of forward contracting, other forward contracting studies in 
one critical way.  Studies to date have evaluated the costs and benefits of forward 
contracting pertaining to storable commodities.  The ability to store a harvested crop 
allows for the harvesting of that crop even when the current market price is below the 
cost of harvest.  Hence, production that is not under contract at the time of harvest might 
still be contracted, or may be sold on the cash market in the future.  Therefore, the ability 
to store a crop offers producers greater flexibility in marketing strategies, which affects 
the potential costs and benefits of forward contracting. 
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Lettuce producers accrue costs and benefits of forward contracting differently, because 
the perishable nature of their crop reduces flexibility in the timing of their contracting 
decisions.  When lettuce is ready to be harvested it must be sold and shipped 
immediately.  If the lettuce is under contract, then it is harvested and shipped regardless 
of expected negative returns.  If lettuce is not contracted then it is either harvested and 
sold at current cash market prices, or it is plowed under.  Due to the perishability of 
lettuce, lettuce producers must contract production well in advance of harvest to ensure 
that they can quickly ship their product once it leaves the field.  A truncation of average 
market price was proposed, which accounts for the potential economic decision not to 
harvest.  In addition, contract prices were based on expected costs, to account for the 
timing of contract decisions in the lettuce industry.  The use of this method accounts for 
the possibility of negative returns under a forward contracting scenario. 
This study supersedes, with respect to accounting for the stochastic nature of the 
lettuce industry, other head lettuce models, due to its use of stochastic simulation.  
Lettuce models to date have reported point estimates of endogenous variables, based on 
deterministic equations.  Standard errors are also reported, which allows for the 
estimation of confidence intervals.  However, the use of mean and variance estimates to 
calculate confidence intervals lacks precision, particularly when distributions are not 
normal.  In addition, lettuce producers might find the procedure cumbersome and 
ultimately unusable in making risky management choices. 
The model proposed in this research directly estimates the entire probability 
distributions of endogenous variables by utilizing stochastic simulation.  Hence, 
probabilities of risky outcomes are directly generated and reported.  These results account 
for the true stochastic nature of the Salinas Valley lettuce industry, and therefore offer 
lettuce producers more realistic and useable information than past lettuce models. 
 
 
Model Construction 
 
Grower Panel 
In order to correctly specify the Salinas Valley model, certain cultural, management 
and marketing practices were also identified.  This information was obtained from a focus 
group of Salinas Valley lettuce producers and shippers.  The information was used to 
refine the Salinas Valley model, which allowed for the construction of a more practical 
and useful lettuce model. 
The panel shared the following information.  Head lettuce is typically planted in the 
Salinas Valley between January and July, for harvest between April and October.  The 
current average yield per acre in the Salinas Valley is approximately 850 fifty pound 
boxes.  Lettuce producers plant so that they can harvest approximately the same amount 
of lettuce each week of the harvest period.  Acres planted is a decision made prior to the 
beginning of the season, and is primarily driven by past acreage planted.  If a farmer is a 
lettuce producer, then they will grow lettuce each year, with minimum fluctuation in the 
amount of acres planted.  Once planting decisions are made, they are not adjusted intra-
season based on price.  Commitments made to buyers reduce much of the flexibility with 
respect to harvested acres.  Price received during the last season is also a determinant of 
planted acres. 
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Forward contracts are typically entered into a year in advance, and cover the entire 
upcoming growing season.  Contracts are based on an “open book” basis, with large 
buyers contracting at approximately 1-3% over the average cost of production.  Average 
production costs in the Salinas Valley are approximately $8500 per acre for flat pack, 
naked head lettuce2.  All subsequent lettuce prices are based on the price of flat pack, 
naked lettuce.  However, only 2-5% of Salinas Valley lettuce is packed naked. 
The grower/shipper panel believes that most lettuce growers would not survive 
without forward contracting, and that government money would be more helpful if spent 
on marketing and production research, and to reduce tariffs, than being used for a safety 
net program.  They also believe that any type of government safety net to reduce risk 
would actually make the producers worse off.   
 
Salinas Valley 
The theoretical model begins with annual Salinas Valley lettuce producer net income 
per acre as a function of the weekly price and yield for Salinas Valley lettuce less the 
total cost of producing and getting the lettuce to market.  Weekly Salinas Valley yield is a 
function of technology, which changes over time, and the price of lettuce during a 
particular week.  Due to the perishable nature of lettuce, if the price of lettuce is below 
the harvest cost per unit, then lettuce will not be harvested and will be plowed under.  
Weekly Salinas Valley price is determined by the supply and demand of lettuce during a 
particular week.  Hence, annual Salinas Valley lettuce producer net income per acre can 
be modeled as 
(1) NIt = [∑ R(x
=
n
i 1
i)] – C(xt) 
and 
 
(2) R(xi) = ƒ(Ti, Qsi, Qdi) 
  
where NIt is annual net income per acre in year t; R(xi) is revenue per acre in week i; 
C(xt) is annual cost per acre in year t; Ti is week i; Qsi is quantity supplied in week i; and 
Qdi is quantity demanded in week i. 
Since annual costs are a function of weekly output, variable input costs per unit, and 
fixed costs, while weekly output is a function of time and price, and price is a function of 
supply and demand, then annual cost per acre can be modeled as 
 
(3) C(xt) = ƒ( Ti, Qsi, Qdi, VCxi, FCt) 
 
where VCxi is variable input costs per unit in week i, and FCt is annual fixed costs per 
acre in year t. 
While it may seem academic to outline the functional relationship between price, 
determined by supply and demand, and supply, these relationships have specific impacts 
of note when modeling a perishable crop such as lettuce.  Producer theory suggests that 
supply is a function of expected price, which influences acres planted, and yield per acre.  
Furthermore, supply per acre is equal to yield per acre.  While this convention may hold 
for non-perishable crops, Baires and Clevenger recognized that in perishable crops, 
potential yield exceeds the actual amount harvested.  Hence, lettuce supply per acre is not 
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equal to yield per acre.  Since lettuce cannot be stored for any meaningful length of time, 
the crop will be plowed under if the weekly price cannot cover the harvest costs.  
Therefore, expected price influences potential supply, but spot price determines actual 
supply. 
It follows that harvest costs are directly influenced by spot price, because the cost of 
harvest will not be incurred if the spot price falls below the harvest cost per unit.  Hence, 
a simplifying assumption is made in this paper.  It is assumed that the average annual 
price per unit of output cannot fall below the harvest cost per unit.  If average price were 
to fall below the average cost of harvest, it would not be economically rational to supply 
lettuce. 
In order to further simplify the Salinas Valley model, an assumption is made that 
average annual Salinas Valley prices and yields conform to a historical relationship with 
average California prices and yields.  This assumption is based on the fact that over 90% 
of California lettuce is produced in the Salinas Valley.  The true causal relationships 
could be modeled as 
 
(4) PtCA = ƒ(PtS) 
 
and 
 
(5) YLDtCA = ƒ(YLDtS) 
 
where PtCA is the average California price per unit in year t; PtS is the average Salinas 
Valley price per unit in year t; YLDtCA is the average California yield per acre in year t; 
and YLDtS is the average Salinas Valley yield per acre in year t. 
However, the actual causal relationships between California and the Salinas Valley are 
not of primary concern.  Accurate estimates of Salinas Valley yield and price are critical.  
Therefore, the simplifying assumption is that once annual California price and yield are 
estimated, those estimates can be adjusted to arrive at annual Salinas Valley estimates, 
based on historical relationships in which causality is not inferred.  This method can 
result in underestimating the variability in Salinas Valley price and yield.  To account for 
greater variability, annual Salinas Valley estimates were then reduced to weekly 
estimates using weekly indices, for use in equation (1). 
 
California 
Annual California yield is assumed to be a function of the expected price to be 
received by growers, and technology, which changes over time.  Therefore, California 
yield per acre is modeled as 
 
(6) YLDtCA = ƒ(EPt, Trend) 
 
where YLDtCA is the average California yield per acre in year t; EPt is the price expected 
by growers in year t; and Trend is a yearly counter. 
Average annual California price in year t (PtCA) is assumed to have a historical 
relationship to average U.S. price in year t (PtUS).  While the true causal relationship is 
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that PtCA affects PtUS, the simplifying assumption is made that PtCA can be estimated as a 
mathematical relationship to PtUS, without inferring causality. 
 
United States 
Supply and demand in the Salinas Valley have historical relationships with average 
California yield and average California price, which have historical relationships with 
U.S. yield and with total U.S. supply and demand.  Hence, a model of supply and demand 
for Salinas Valley lettuce begins with an aggregate U.S. model: 
 
(7) Qst = Qmt + (YLDtUS*HAt) 
 
and 
 
(8) Qdt = DDt + XDt
 
where Qst is total U.S. supply in year t; Qmt is import quantity in year t; YLDtUS is U.S. 
yield per acre in year t; HAt is total U.S. harvested acreage in year t; Qdt is total U.S. 
quantity demanded in year t; DDt is domestic demand in year t; and XDt is export 
demand in year t. 
The theoretical model also assumes that U.S. harvested acreage and U.S. yield per acre 
are functions of the price expected to be received by growers.  The expected price is 
considered to be the “naïve price expectation” (PUSt-1) under spot market conditions, but 
can change when forward contracting and/or a government target price are implemented, 
such that: 
 
(9) EPt  = PUSt-1, under spot market pricing, 
  = Pc, under forward contract pricing, and  
  = max(PUSt-1, Pg), under a government target price scenario 
 
where PUSt-1 is the previous year’s price; Pc is the forward contract price; and Pg is a 
hypothetical government target price. 
 
Empirical Model Design 
The empirical design was constructed beginning with the U.S. level model.  After 
examining past lettuce models, six regression equations were estimated individually 
using OLS.  U.S. level parameters affecting harvested acreage, yield, import quantity, 
domestic demand, and export demand were estimated.  The sixth equation specified was 
California Yield.  Parameters were estimated using annual data for years 1971 through 
2002.  The parameters were later used to estimate the values of the six variables for years 
2003 through 2012.   
In order to capture the associated risk in the deterministic models, the six regression 
equations were modified to be stochastic.  The stochastic components are represented by 
the amount of historical error (residuals) in each equation.  Stochastic shocks were 
simulated and combined with deterministic regression equations.  The recursive, 
POLYSYS modeling method outlined by Ray and Richardson was used to simulate U.S. 
supply, demand, and price for years 2003 through 2012.  The estimated export and 
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domestic demand equations were combined and reduced, so that equilibrium price in year 
t could be solved directly from quantity supplied. 
Statistical tests on the residuals from the regression equations revealed that not all 
distributions were normal, and that correlation existed between the equations’ residuals.  
Hence, a multivariate empirical distribution of residuals was simulated.  A matrix of 
correlated empirical deviations for the six variables was simulated for each of the ten 
forecast years.  The simulated data matrix for each year was compared to the historical 
data matrix.  Due to the multivariate nature of the data, Hotelling’s T-Squared tests were 
conducted to test the null hypothesis that the mean vectors are equal, at the 95% 
confidence level.  Next, Box’s M Tests were conducted to test for homogeneity of 
covariance matrices at the 95% confidence level.  The correlation matrices for the 
simulated values were then compared to the historical correlation matrix, in order to test 
whether or not the proper correlation between variables was maintained.  A Student’s t 
was used to test each of the coefficients. 
California price was estimated directly from stochastic U.S. price using an adjustment 
factor; causality is not inferred.  Annual Salinas Valley price and yield were estimated 
directly from California price and yield using adjustment factors; causality is not inferred.  
To account for any underestimation in variability due to the process described above, 
weekly Salinas Valley price and yield estimates were constructed. Seven years of weekly 
Salinas Valley price and yield data was used to estimate weekly indices.  These indices 
were then used to adjust the annual Salinas Valley price and yield estimates to get weekly 
price and yield estimates. 
Stochastic, weekly Salinas Valley price and yield estimates were combined to estimate 
annual Salinas Valley revenue per acre.  University of California cost study data was 
adjusted using the estimated Fruit and Vegetable Producer Price Index, to estimate 
Salinas Valley cost per acre.  Per acre revenue and cost estimates were used to estimate 
Salinas Valley net income per acre through 2012. 
 
 
Results 
The completed simulation model was used to estimate probability distributions for 
Salinas Valley net income under three pricing scenarios; free market price determination, 
forward contracting, and a hypothetical government safety net program.  The price 
expected by growers depended on the scenario simulated, and therefore impacted supply.  
Under the free market scenario it was assumed that 100% of production was sold in the 
cash market.  Under the forward contracting scenario it was assumed that 100% of 
production was sold at the contract price.  Therefore, no scenario assumed partial forward 
contracting. 
The three simulated distributions for each year were then used to calculate the 
probabilities of meeting specified net income per acre thresholds under each scenario.  
The three thresholds were defined as; less than or equal to zero, greater than zero, but 
equal to or less than $500, and greater than $500. 
Six endogenous variables were estimated using the ordinary least squares approach.  
Historical data (1971-2002) was used to estimate the parameters of those six equations.  
The results of the parameter estimation are presented in Table 1.  The size and signs of 
the coefficients matched theoretical expectations.  Based on T-ratios, F-statistics, and the  
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Table 1.  Regression Equations3
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
     
    R2 Adj. 
U.S. Harvested Acreage 80.8 Coefficient Std. Error t-stat  p-value 
Constant    34703.44 27760  1.250  0.222 
EPt     3011.02 669.6  4.497  0.000 
HAt-1     .793  .112  7.063  0.000 
Trend     -1495.16 297.5  -5.025  0.000 
 
U.S. Yield   92.5 Coefficient Std. Error t-stat  p-value 
Constant    236.08  7.107  33.220  0.000 
EPt     -4.05  1.093  -3.705  0.001 
Trend     6.04  .483  12.494  0.000 
 
Import Quantity  67.1 Coefficient Std. Error t-stat  p-value 
Constant    148922.22 143640 1.037  0.309 
Pr     -8898.56 6229  -1.429  0.164 
Pr2     180.63  62.131  2.907  0.007 
 
Domestic Demand  63.5 Coefficient Std. Error t-stat  p-value 
Constant    51857266.81 2446297 21.198  0.000 
Pt     -500877.65 358493 -1.397  0.173 
Trend     782198.60 163997 4.770  0.000 
 
Export Demand  57.6 Coefficient Std. Error t-stat  p-value 
Constant    1059731.02 500791 2.116  0.043 
Trend     -140280.98 26847  -5.225  0.000 
Ln Trend    2157462.82 342853 6.293  0.000 
 
California Yield  83.0 Coefficient Std. Error t-stat  p-value 
Constant    258.27  10.715  24.103  0.000 
EPt     -4.84  1.648  -2.935  0.007 
Trend     6.10  .728  8.375  0.000 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
adjusted R2 for each equation, the calculated equations represent a reasonable set of 
parameters for estimating the values of the six given variables.  Based on the variance  
inflation factors, there appeared to be no significant influence from multicollinearity.  
Moreover, Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that first-order serial correlation was either 
indeterminate or was not evident. 
A matrix of correlated empirical deviations for the six variables was simulated for 
each of the ten forecast years.  The simulated data matrix for each year was compared to 
the historical data matrix.  Due to the multivariate nature of the data, Hotelling’s T-
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Squared tests were conducted to test the null hypothesis that the mean vectors are equal, 
at the 95% confidence level.  The P-value of the test for each year was near 1.00, and 
therefore the null hypothesis was not rejected.  The ten simulated mean vectors were 
found to be homogenous to the historical mean vector.  Next, Box’s M Tests were 
conducted to test for homogeneity of covariance matrices at the 95% confidence level.  
The P-value for each of the ten tests was near 1.00, therefore the null hypothesis was not 
rejected.  The ten covariance matrices were found to be homogeneous to the historical 
covariance matrix.  Next, the correlation matrices for the simulated values were 
compared to the historical correlation matrix, in order to test whether or not the proper 
correlation between variables was maintained.  A Student’s T was used to test each of the 
coefficients, and the correlation matrices were found to be statistically equivalent. 
The use of empirical distributions in this model has two distinct advantages over using 
normal distributions.  First, normality tests and visual appraisal of probability density 
functions suggests that the simulated empirical distributions would better fit the historical 
distributions.  Secondly, if normal distributions were used, then the coefficient of 
variation for any variable exhibiting trend would not be stable over time.  Since the units 
of the empirical distribution are in percent deviation, the coefficient of variation is stable 
regardless of trend.  The normal distribution could be adjusted to be COV stable, but that 
would require further steps in the modeling process. 
Historical average annual California price was compared to historical U.S. price.  It 
was found that on average California price tends to be approximately 99% of the U.S. 
price in any given year.  Therefore an adjustment factor of .99 was used to estimate 
California price from U.S. price. 
A Pearson Correlation coefficient was estimated for the annual Salinas Valley price 
versus the annual California price for years 1996 through 2002.  The correlation 
coefficient for Salinas Valley price was calculated to be .91, the correlation was found to 
be significant at the 95% confidence level.  The stochastic annual California price 
estimates were multiplied by .91 to produce the stochastic annual Salinas Valley price 
estimates for 2003 through 2012. 
Annual average yield per acre data from the Monterey County Agriculture 
Commissioner’s Office was compared to the annual average yield data for California.  It 
was found that on average, Salinas Valley yield tends to be approximately 16% higher 
than average California yield.  Therefore, for model simulation the stochastic California 
yield estimates were multiplied by 1.16 to produce stochastic Salinas Valley yield 
estimates for 2003-2012. 
The estimated Fruit and Vegetable Producer Price Index Base 1982 (FVPPI82) was 
used to adjust University of California cost data to estimate costs per acre for years 2003-
2012.  The estimated FVPPI82 values for 2003-2012 were collected from NFAPP.  Total 
cost estimates per acre are shown in Table 2.  Costs include all land preparation, cultural, 
overhead, harvesting, packing, and cooling costs. 
The empirical results of the three simulated scenarios are presented in Table 3.  The 
most profitable outcomes for each year are shown in green and the least profitable 
outcomes are shown in red.  While the results can be viewed in different ways depending 
on the risk averseness of each individual, some general observations can be made.  
However, when interpreting the results, the following caveats should be kept in mind.  
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Table 2.  Estimated Cost per Acre 2003-2012 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
Estimated Cost  8055 8258 8490 8725 8939 9155 9375 9599 9826 10055 
($/acre) 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Caveats 
This study assumes that the probability distributions of the six variables estimated 
using ordinary least squares regression conform to their historical norms through year 
2012.  Over 30 years of data was used to create the historical distributions, which at this 
time is the best indicator of future distributions.  It is also assumed that the relationships 
between California and Salinas Valley data remain stable.  The yield relationship 
between California and Salinas Valley was established using relatively few years of data. 
It is assumed that the exogenous data collected is accurate.  The weekly Salinas Valley 
data from Grower’s Express is reported to be from the Federal State Market News, which 
is regarded to be one of the most accurate accounts of market data.  The historical data 
collected from NFAPP was spot-checked against reported USDA data, and was found to 
match, therefore it is assumed to be from credible sources. 
It is assumed that the forward contract level of 3% above expected costs is an accurate 
representation of a typical U.S. lettuce contract.  The growers and shippers interviewed 
represent a cross section of the lettuce industry, and deal with lettuce production in both 
California and Arizona, where 96% of U.S. lettuce is grown.  Therefore, their accounts of 
contract specifications should be fairly representative. 
It is further assumed that a government target price set at 85% of the cost of 
production is a reasonable, hypothetical support scenario.  While the details of the 
hypothetical program have not been established, it is assumed that the program would 
function most similarly to a target-price-deficiency-payment program.  However, 
payments would be based on actual production, and the program would feature no “set 
aside” requirements. The key factor is that the program would truncate the bottom of the 
distribution function of prices expected by producers.  In regards to the target price, it is 
also assumed that it would not be adjusted each year to reflect increased production costs, 
but would only be adjusted intermittently over the long-run.  U.S. farm policy tends to 
change only when a Farm Bill is up for revision, and not all crop programs are revised in 
each bill.  It is assumed that any government target price would be based on Salinas 
Valley production costs, since the Salinas Valley represents a large portion of U.S. 
production, and would tend to have higher costs than Arizona.  Therefore, a government 
target price would need to be based on Salinas Valley data in order to provide a suitable 
safety net.  It is assumed that Salinas Valley harvest costs are representative of the U.S. 
lettuce industry, because they are made up of costs that tend to be very similar between 
Arizona and California, which produce 96% of U.S. lettuce. 
The assumptions preclude those producers, who have higher than average production 
costs, and therefore cannot secure forward contracts, or must do so at a loss.  The scope  
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Table 3.  Summary of Simulated Net Income Results 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Salinas Valley Head Lettuce Model 2003-2012      
Net Income per Acre           
Based on 100 Iterations Each Year Under Three Different Scenarios:      
1)  Cash Marketing           
2)  100% Forward Contracting (Contract Price is set at 3% above expected Cost of Production)    
3)  A Target Price Policy (Target Price is set at 85% of California Production Cost in 2003, which is $18.71/Cwt.) 
           
    Summary of Net Income ($/Acre)    
           
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Probability ≤ 0 Under 
Cash Marketing 54% 69% 76% 72% 71% 67% 65% 71% 73% 71% 
Probability ≤ 0 Under 
Contracting 31% 32% 48% 37% 40% 27% 38% 38% 36% 33% 
Probability ≤ 0 Under 
Price Support 36% 53% 62% 59% 69% 72% 66% 67% 67% 73% 
                      
Probability > 0 ≤ 500 
Under Cash Marketing 11% 7% 5% 5% 3% 8% 8% 1% 6% 6% 
Probability > 0 ≤ 500 
Under Contracting 37% 32% 37% 43% 34% 44% 35% 36% 34% 28% 
Probability > 0 ≤ 500 
Under Price Support 24% 19% 21% 20% 17% 14% 13% 13% 10% 7% 
                      
Probability > 500 
Under Cash Marketing 35% 24% 19% 23% 26% 25% 27% 28% 21% 23% 
Probability > 500 
Under Contracting 32% 36% 15% 20% 26% 29% 27% 26% 30% 39% 
Probability > 500 
Under Price Support 40% 28% 17% 21% 14% 14% 21% 20% 23% 20% 
                      
Maximum Under Cash 
Marketing $4,916 $6,007 $9,019 $7,919 $4,840 $10,277 $7,505 $8,940 $6,433 $9,682 
Maximum Under 
Contracting $1,409 $1,957 $1,388 $1,626 $1,574 $1,669 $1,830 $1,597 $1,807 $1,658 
Maximum Under 
Price Support $4,916 $4,702 $7,696 $4,367 $4,119 $7,042 $5,391 $7,725 $5,630 $7,152 
                      
Minimum Under Cash 
Marketing ($3,199) ($3,214) ($3,729) ($2,783) ($3,656) ($3,995) ($3,614) ($3,796) ($4,022) ($3,827) 
Minimum Under 
Contracting ($927) ($1,472) ($1,641) ($1,954) ($1,197) ($1,130) ($1,520) ($1,116) ($1,339) ($1,642) 
Minimum Under 
Price Support ($1,207) ($1,884) ($1,958) ($2,482) ($1,860) ($1,917) ($2,447) ($2,361) ($2,404) ($2,888) 
                      
Expected Value Under 
Cash Marketing ($3) ($441) ($731) ($547) ($685) ($340) ($333) ($393) ($701) ($576) 
Expected Value Under 
Contracting $239 $202 $29 $86 $169 $278 $191 $141 $192 $278 
Expected Value Under 
Price Support $602 $198 $103 $20 ($172) $0 ($31) $4 ($123) ($142) 
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of this project does not empirically examine the effects of contracting only a portion of a 
firm’s production.  The model designed in this research estimates net income based on 
certain information that is specific to the Salinas Valley, therefore alterations would have 
to be made before utilizing the model to estimate net income of producers in other 
geographic areas. 
The results are based on assumed levels of contract and government target prices.  
Any changes to those assumptions can greatly affect the results.  For ease of reading, the 
explanations given below are written as if they encompass all derivations of forward 
contracting and price support.  Therefore the reader is advised to apply the following 
phrase when examining reported results, “At the given levels of contract and government 
target prices”.  In other words, while this phrase is not explicitly used in all discussion of 
results, it is assumed. 
 
General observations from results are as follows: 
• Forward contracting versus cash marketing reduces the probability of losing 
money by approximately 50% each year. 
• A probability of losing money under contracting still exists, due to unexpected 
drops in yield. 
• Government support versus cash marketing reduces the probability of losing 
money by 10-15% in early years. 
• Under cash marketing growers tend to either lose money or make at least 
$500/acre in any given year, with a small probability of making between $0 and 
$500. 
• In all years but the first, there is greater probability of making at least $500/acre 
under either cash marketing or contract pricing versus government support. 
• In general, contracting does not reduce the probability of making at least 
$500/acre. 
• The potential maximum net income under cash marketing exceeds that of the 
other two scenarios in all years but the first. 
• The potential maximum net income under government support exceeds that 
available under contracting in any given year. 
• The potential minimum net income is smallest under cash marketing in any given 
year. 
• The potential minimum net income is greatest under contracting in any given 
year. 
• Variability in price is greatly reduced under contracting. 
• Producers are expected to lose money in every year under cash marketing. 
• Producers are expected to make money every year under contracting. 
• Producers are expected to lose money in four out of ten years under government 
support. 
 
On average, it appears that producers maximize total returns by utilizing forward 
contracts.  However, forward contracts do limit the upside price potential.  The less risk-
averse producers may or may not be better off from year to year utilizing forward 
contracts.  Therefore, risk-averse producers appear better off utilizing forward contracts, 
while less risk-averse producers might prefer to use a combination of both contracts and 
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free market scenarios.  The results also confirm the grower panel’s suggestion that 
without forward contracts most growers would financially fail. 
In general the results suggest that lettuce producers selling in the cash market would 
gain from a government safety net designed in this fashion.  Upside potential in price 
under the government safety net scenario is reduced, but downside risk is also reduced.  
On the average, producers would have greater returns with this type of government 
support versus having no support or contracts.   
The results in Table 3 indicate that in general, forward contracting optimally 
mitigates price risk, by maximizing profitability per acre.  However, in order to more 
clearly present results, the total 10-year estimated net income under each scenario was 
simulated.  The cumulative distribution functions (CDF’s) for estimated 10-year net 
income are shown in Figure 1. 
   
Figure 1.  Cumulative Distributions for Simulated 10-Year Net Income Per Acre 
Comparison of 3 CDF Series
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Figure 1 clearly indicates that at each probability level, producers are expected to 
make the least amount of profit under the cash marketing scenario.  Over the 10-year 
period producers are expected to have approximately a 10% chance of being profitable 
using cash market pricing.  Producers are expected to have a 90% probability of being 
profitable using forward contracts, and a 45% probability of being profitable with the 
hypothetical government support. 
Figure 1 also indicates that there is approximately a 92% probability of making a 
greater profit under the contracting scenario versus the government support scenario.  
However, the upper tail of the CDF for the government support scenario extends much 
further to the right, and therefore maximum potential is greater using the government 
support.   
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Therefore, it is plausible that a producer with an extremely high risk-preference might 
prefer the government support scenario over the forward contracting scenario.  In an 
attempt to reconcile this observation, a Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function 
(SDRF) process was used.  The expected differences in net income between the 
contracting scenario and the government support scenario at each probability level were 
weighted using a Risk Aversion Coefficient (RAC) and then summed.  The RAC level in 
question was that of a highly risk-preferring Salinas Valley lettuce producer.  Pratt 
defines the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of a set of producers (r(x)) as the ratio of 
the second and first derivatives of the growers’ utility function, or r(x) = -u’’(x)/u’(x). 
Since the utility function with respect to profit for Salinas Valley lettuce producers 
was unknown, the absolute RAC level of Salinas Valley producers was estimated using a 
procedure suggested by McCarl and Bessler.  The estimated RAC was found using the 
formula:  2*(Coef. of Var.)/Std. Dev.  The coefficient of variation and standard deviation 
used were from the distribution of 10-year net income under the government support 
scenario.  The formula yielded an estimated RAC of .15.  Anderson and Dillon suggest 
that as a rule of thumb, the RAC of a more risk preferring group of producers can be 
estimated as one half that of the general RAC level.  Therefore, the RAC used in this 
comparison was .075.  Using the SDRF procedure, it was found that even at low levels of 
risk preference (RAC .075), total utility was still greater under the forward contracting 
scenario. 
 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
Price risk continues to have a significant impact on the management and marketing 
strategies used by Salinas Valley lettuce producers.  The prevalence of forward 
contracting has contributed to thinner cash markets and has therefore lead to greater spot 
price variability.  Government mechanisms to mitigate price risk for commodity 
producers have been widely used, however specialty crop producers have historically 
used market mechanisms to manage price risk.  These factors have fueled the use of 
forward contract pricing by Salinas Valley lettuce producers as a means to manage that 
risk.  While forward contracting does limit downside risk, it adds the risk of producers 
being excluded from receiving higher prices in times of price spikes. 
An econometric framework was used to estimate the future pecuniary benefits and 
costs of contract pricing versus cash market pricing and other risk-mitigating 
mechanisms.  Results indicate that Salinas Valley lettuce producers should maximize 
profitability by using forward contracts.  In the long run, cash marketing is clearly First-
Order Stochastically Dominated by both forward contracting and the hypothetical 
government program. 
Salinas Valley lettuce producers must continually make management decisions that 
affect the profitability of their firms.  As forward contracting becomes an increasingly 
preferred choice by these producers, they are left to question the specific costs and 
benefits of doing so.  In addition, while many Salinas Valley lettuce producers claim that 
a government support program would make them less profitable, they have little 
empirical evidence to support that claim. 
The implications of the results of this research are positive for Salinas Valley lettuce 
producers who continue to secure forward contracts.  However, the results suggest that 
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those producers who cannot or will not secure forward contracts may face financial 
difficulty.  The results of this study reinforce the importance of cost efficiency, since 
lower costs allow for more competitive contract prices, while still remaining profitable.  
The results also offer empirical evidence that Salinas Valley lettuce producers should 
continue to favor the market mechanism of contract pricing, as opposed to a 
governmental support program like the one considered here.  Producers should work hard 
to establish/maintain contractual relationships, and should work to improve the terms of 
these contracts.  The results from this study can assist many fresh-market fruit and 
vegetable industries in making more informed decisions on preferred marketing methods. 
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Endnotes 
1Specialty crops are defined as fruit, vegetable, nut, nursery, and certain animal products (California 
Institute for the Study of Specialty Crops). 
2Flat pack, naked head lettuce refers to lettuce that is packed unwrapped and placed into the carton 
without any separators between heads. 
3Independent variables:  EPt is expected U.S. grower price in time t; HAt-1 is U.S. harvested acreage in 
time t-1; Trend is a yearly counter; Pr is the U.S. retail lettuce price; Pr2 is the U.S. retail lettuce price 
squared; Pt is U.S. grower price in time t; and Ln Trend is the natural log of the yearly counter.
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